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California's Opportunity to Create
Historical Precedent Regarding a
Mediated Settlement Agreement's Effect
on Mediation Confidentiality and
Arbitrability
Susan Nauss Exon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation and arbitration are individual, separate dispute resolution proc-
esses. Yet circumstances may allow them to become intermingled such as when
a mediated settlement agreement includes a provision to arbitrate any future
disputes. Problems may arise when parties cannot finalize the mediated settle-
ment agreement as they attempt to memorialize it in a formal writing. Media-
tion confidentiality can exacerbate the problems. This scenario was addressed
by the California Court of Appeal for the First District in Fair v. Bakhtiari.'
Fair v. Bakhtiari involved two main issues relating to a mediated written
agreement signed by the parties and mediator, called "Settlement Terms" (Set-
tlement Terms Document). The first issue was whether the Settlement Terms
Document complied with a statutory exception to mediation confidentiality of
written settlement agreements, and therefore, was discoverable. 2 Specifically,
could the wording of the arbitration clause within the agreement be construed to
mean that the Settlement Terms Document was binding or enforceable pursuant
to California Evidence Code section 1123(b)?3 The second issue examined
whether the arbitration clause of the Settlement Terms Document, stating "all
* © 2005 Susan Nauss Exon, Associate Professor of Law, University of La Verne College
of Law; J.D. 1989, University of Wyoming College of Law. I owe much appreciation and gratitude
to Jack McCrory for encouraging me to write this article and for the countless hours that he spent
reviewing and discussing earlier drafts with me. I also gratefully acknowledge Juanda Lowder
Daniel for her helpful comments.
1. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Ct. App. 2004).
2. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123 (West 2005) sets forth exceptions to mediation confidentiality
when a settlement agreement is involved.
3. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123(b) (West 2005) provides that a written mediated settlement
agreement that is signed by all parties may be admissible, and hence not subject to mediation confi-
dentiality, when it "provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect."
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future disputes subject to JAMS arbitration," constituted a valid agreement to
arbitrate. The court of appeal responded affirmatively to both issues.
On January 12, 2005, the California Supreme Court granted review of Fair
and depublished the court of appeal's opinion.4 The forthcoming decision will
have important implications for dispute resolution professionals because the
California Supreme Court will have an opportunity to construe California Evi-
dence Code section 1123 for the first time. The decision should provide helpful
guidance regarding the confidentiality of mediated settlement agreements and
the impact that such agreements have on other dispute resolution processes such
as arbitration. The confidentiality issues raised in Fair are so critical for dispute
resolution professionals that it is necessary to call attention to them now rather
than wait a year or more for the California Supreme Court to speak.
Confidentiality serves as a cornerstone of mediation. The public policy un-
derlying confidentiality is the promotion of candid communications between
disputing parties.5 As explained in this article, mediation confidentiality affects
more than just communication. It affects other important mediation values, such
as party self-determination and mediator impartiality. Mediation confidentiality
affects parties' ability to enforce their mediated agreements. Finally, confidenti-
ality affects multiple dispute resolution processes, as seen by the interrelated
nature of mediation and arbitration in Fair.
The purpose of this article is to summarize, analyze, and critique the two is-
sues of Fair with an emphasis on mediation confidentiality. Part II of this arti-
cle examines background legal authorities that surround the issues of the princi-
pal case, including the interpretation of settlement agreements, mediation confi-
dentiality, and the validity of arbitration clauses. Part III follows with a sum-
mary of the Fair court of appeal's factual description and legal analysis. Part IV
then sets forth a complete analysis and critique of the Fair issues.
As discussed in Part IV, the court of appeal's holding was correct. Despite
the correct result, this author offers suggestions for a more thorough analysis. In
particular, the sequence of the analysis could be improved and the court could
have addressed the tension between mediation confidentiality and the public
policy implications of the enforceability of settlement agreements. Additionally,
the court of appeal should not have depublished the second issue, because it has
precedential value.
Of paramount concern, however, is the effect of the court's finding that an
agreement to arbitrate was found within the Settlement Terms Document. The
court's analysis cannot stop with that finding because an arbitrator needs author-
ity to act if an arbitration agreement is found to exist. An arbitrator will not be
4. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295 (Cal. Jan. 12, 2005).
5. See infra notes 22 - 23 and accompanying text.
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able to examine communications and evidence offered at the mediation due to
California's narrow interpretation of its mediation confidentiality statutes.
The solution, then, is to treat mediated settlement agreements different from
other aspects of the mediation process; Evidence Code section 1123 seeks to do
this. However, section 1123 does not go far enough to aid parties who attempt
to enforce mediated settlement agreements. If mediation parties are willing to
sign a final agreement, they should be able to rely on general contract law prin-
ciples to prove the intent of the agreement. The parties should be able to enforce
their mediated settlement agreement by piercing mediation confidentiality.
Without the signed settlement agreement, however, the confidentiality of media-
tions should remain intact.
The California Supreme Court has an opportunity to impact the field of dis-
pute resolution in a significant manner. The Fair appeal provides the first op-
portunity for the Supreme Court to interpret Evidence Code section 1123 and set
forth a sound standard for confidentiality of mediated settlement agreements.
The Supreme Court's opinion will affect not only mediations, but also arbitra-
tions inasmuch as the two processes become interrelated through the execution
of a mediated settlement agreement.
II. BACKGROUND LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. What Constitutes a Valid Settlement Agreement
California law treats settlement agreements as contracts; legal principles
that apply to contracts, such as "reasonably certain" and "definite" terms, apply
equally to settlement agreements.6 The parties to a contract must mutually con-
sent to its terms. 7 The existence of mutual intention should be determined as of
"the time of contracting . 8..."' Courts look at objective criteria rather than sub-
jective criteria when determining whether parties had mutual consent to con-
tract.9 This objective test is "what the outward manifestations of consent would
6. Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 276-77 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting
such contract provisions as the requirement for "reasonably certain" and "sufficiently definite"
terms).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1550, 1565 (West 2005).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 2005).
9. Weddington Prods., Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
3
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lead a reasonable person to believe."1 In making such determinations, courts
focus primarily on the acts of the parties."
Courts take varying positions when analyzing negotiated contracts that have
not yet been formally signed. When the contract itself as well as other evidence
shows that the contract becomes operative only when signed by the parties, the
failure to sign it means that no binding contract is created. 2 If the parties orally
agree to all terms of a proposed written contract, the oral contract may constitute
mutual assent, and therefore, the failure to sign a formalized written contract
will not destroy the binding effect of the oral contract. 3 Moreover, when parties
enter into an initial agreement that contemplates subsequent documentation, the
initial agreement remains valid even though the parties fail to follow through
with the documentation in good faith.' 4
Because settlement is considered a critical process, parties must have full
knowledge and consent to the settlement terms. 5 A written settlement agree-
ment, including party signatures, tends to illustrate "reflection and deliberate
assent."'
16
10. Meyer v. Benko, 127 Cal. Rptr. 846, 848 (Ct. App. 1976).
11. Id.
12. Beck v. American Health Group Intern., Inc., 260 Cal. Rptr. 237, 241-42 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that a signed letter did not constitute a binding contract because it merely outlined a pro-
posed future agreement and served as evidence that no binding contract would be created until
drafted and approved by all parties); see Banner Entm't, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598,
603 (Ct. App. 1998).
13. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 87 Cal. App. 2d 620, 629 (Ct. App. 1948) (affirming
the trial court's holding of the binding effect of an oral agreement of employment as a director for a
motion picture company even though never formally reduced to a writing because the writing was
not a condition precedent to the validity of the oral agreement); see Banner Entre't, Inc., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 603-04.
14. See ERSA GRAE Corp. v. Fluor Corp., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 295 n.3 (Ct. App. 1991)
(discussing a situation where parties agreed to initial terms to create a valid, enforceable agreement
even though a subsequent counteroffer contemplated further documentation regarding additional
terms).
15. Weddington Prods., Inc.,v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 276 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing
the serious nature of settlement agreements within the summary procedures of Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 664.6).
16. Id. (discussing the serious nature of settlement agreements within the summary procedures
of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6).
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol5/iss2/2
[Vol. 5: 2, 2005]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
B. Mediation Confidentiality
1. Purpose and Intent Regarding Mediation Confidentiality
Confidentiality forms a fundamental value of mediations. This is evidenced
by the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators,17 the Uniform Mediation
Act, 8 and various codes and written standards of conduct for mediators that are
being promulgated throughout the United States. 9 Some states incorporate
confidentiality standards into statutes, court rules or rules of evidence.2' No
uniform confidentiality standard exists, however. As a result, the coverage of
confidentiality may be narrow or broad, limited or extensive, depending on the
jurisdiction. One scholar has delineated the types of mediation confidentiality
into five distinct categories: 1) complete confidentiality; 2) narrow exception for
memorialized settlements (which California and the Uniform Mediation Act
follow); 3) case-by-case approach; 4) broad exception for settlement enforce-
ment; and 5) no statutory coverage. 2'
Confidentiality is vital to mediations for several reasons. First, confidenti-
ality helps foster open communication by the disputants. For example, if the
disputants cannot rely on the confidential nature of the proceedings, they may
feel constrained to lay out the cards of their dispute or make statements that
might be construed as admissions. Most courts uphold the confidentiality of
mediations for public policy reasons.22 Courts, legislative bodies, and scholars
17. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Part V, available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/modelstandardsof- conduct.doc (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
18. Uniform Mediation Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/20O3finaldraft.htm.
19. See, e.g., Colorado Dispute Resolution Act, CRS § 13-22-301; Mediation Council of
Illinois Professional Standards of Practice for Mediators, Standard II (April 2003), available at
http://www.mediationcouncilof- illinois.org/standardspractice.htm; Mississippi Court Annexed
Mediation Rules for Civil Litigation, Rule VIi (June 27, 2002), available at
http:llwww.mssc.state.ms.us/rules.
20. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2005); California's Ethical Standards for Media-
tors, Part 1, Rule 1620.4, available at http://www.mediate.comarticles/calmedrules.cfm (Jan. 1,
2003); Georgia Commission on Dispute Resolution: Ethical Standards, Part VII, available at
http://www.ganet.orglgadr/appendxc.html (Sept. 20, 2000); Rules Adopted by the Kansas Supreme
Court Relating to Mediation, Rule 901(b)(1) (July 1, 1996), available at
http://www.kscourts.org/ctruls/adrls.htm; see also supra note 19.
21. See Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides
with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 33, 45-51 (2001).
22. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal.
2001); Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 160-61 (Ct. App. 1994).
219
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uniformly agree that the mediation process would be eroded but for its confiden-
tial nature.23
Second, if mediation confidentiality promotes candid discussion among par-
ticipants, it may actually reinforce and strengthen the concept of party self-
determination. Party self-determination is seen as a "fundamental principle of
mediation"'24 because parties decide whether or not to enter into a consensual
settlement. As confidentiality vies for supremacy among all of the mediation
values and becomes predictable, it will actually encourage party autonomy.
A third important function of confidentiality relates to the mediator's role as
a neutral and impartial facilitator. A mediator's neutrality relates to her ability
to be objective while facilitating communication among negotiating parties.2"
Impartiality relates to a mediator's ability to serve all participants concurrently
without exhibiting partiality or bias based on any party's background, personal
characteristics or performance during the mediation.26 Some scholars refer to
the terms, neutrality and impartiality, interchangeably.27 Others equate neutral-
ity to the mediation process, including the outcome, and equate impartiality to
the relationship between the mediator and participants. 28 No matter how the
terms are interpreted, a mediator must be both neutral and impartial. A mediator
may infringe on these important qualities if she subsequently testifies as to what
transpired during a mediated session.2 9 In such a situation, the participants also
may lose confidence in the mediator's role.30
23. Deason, supra note 21, at 36.
24. PHYLLIS BERNARD AND BRYANT GARTH, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 73 (American Bar Association 2002).
25. See JAMES J. ALFINI et al., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (2001 LEXIS Publish-
ing).
26. BERNARD & GARTH, supra note 24, at 68.
27. See Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Symposium: Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports
Under the Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003
J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 83-87 (2003) (using the terms "neutrality" and "impartiality" interchangeably as
the authors discuss the standard of conduct for mediator impartiality).
28. Allison Balc, Making it Work at Work: Mediation's Impact on Employee/Employer Rela-
tionships and Mediator Neutrality, 2 PEPP. DiSp. RESOL. L. J. 241, 254-55 (2002) (discussing the
potential impact on a mediator's neutrality based on such issues as funding sources, professional ties
or previous relationships); Karen A. Zerhusen, Reflections on the Role of the Neutral Lawyer: The
Lawyer as Mediator, 81 KY. L.J. 1165, 1169-70 (1993) (noting that a mediator's impartiality applies
to all aspects of the mediation process, from the arrangement of furniture to the way the mediator
poses positioning statements).
29. While the problem of subsequent mediator testimony may take place in some jurisdic-
tions, it does not pose a problem for mediators in California. California mediators are specifically
precluded from testifying in subsequent civil proceedings regarding statements or conduct occurring
at or in conjunction with a mediation, "except as to a statement or conduct that could (a) give rise to
civil or criminal contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be the subject of investigation by the State Bar
or Commission on Judicial Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings under" Code
of Civil Procedure section 170.1(a)(1) or (a)(6). CAL. EvID. CODE § 703.5 (2005).
30. Deason, supra note 21, at 37.
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Inasmuch as confidentiality poses a central value of mediations, it may
compete with other essential values. Many mediations, for example, have a goal
to reach settlement, especially when connected to a court proceeding. The ten-
sion between confidentiality and enforceability of a settlement may infringe
upon one another because confidentiality rules may prevent one party from at-
tempting to show that an enforceable agreement was created. 3' This tension is a
central issue of Fair v. Bakhtiari.
Although confidentiality may foster party autonomy, the exceptions to me-
diation confidentiality may begin to undermine party autonomy. For example, if
parties cannot be assured of predictability of mediation confidentiality, including
its exceptions, they may hesitate to engage in candid discussions or participate
in the mediation process at all.
Finally, if confidentiality principles are allowed to erode the mediation
process, the overall struggle between various aspects of mediations may have far
reaching effects. Hence, confidentiality may adversely affect society's view of
mediations and settlement agreements in general. It may taint the whole notion
of the credibility of an individual's word.32
The public policy aspects of mediation confidentiality have far reaching
implications. As discussed herein, confidentiality promotes candid discussions
that promote successful resolution of mediated disputes. If one is allowed to
undermine this critical mediation value, however, severe disruptions may occur
to mediations and their value in the field of dispute resolution.
2. California's Mediation Confidentiality Provisions
California has enacted statutes to govern mediation confidentiality.33 In
particular, California Evidence Code section 1119 specifies that written and oral
communications made during the mediation process are deemed confidential if
31. See Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Ct. App. 1994) (confronting the tension be-
tween mediation confidentiality and enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement and holding
that evidence of statements made during a mediation are not admissible in a subsequent court pro-
ceeding to prove the existence of a mediated settlement agreement); see also Deason, supra note 21,
at 37.
32. Deason, supra note 21, at 38 ("When a party to a mediation alleges that she did not agree
to a settlement, or challenges the mediated agreement for fraud, duress, or lack of authority, she
essentially claims that her consent was not genuine as understood in contract law. To the extent
contract principles embody society's view of appropriate consent, applying them to avoid unjust
enforcement of agreements can be crucial to maintaining party autonomy and keeping informed
consent at the heart of mediation.").
33. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1115 - 1128 (West 2005).
7
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made within specified parameters. 34 Section 1119 became effective in 1997 to
take the place of former section 1152(a). Section 1119(a) applies to evidence
offered during a mediation. Section 1119(b) applies to written communications.
Finally, section 1119(c) applies to settlement negotiations and discussions made
during a mediation. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of section 1119 specifically ex-
tend the confidentiality provisions to subsequent civil proceedings such as arbi-
tration, administrative adjudication and other civil actions.35
The legislative intent behind these provisions of the Evidence Code is "to
promote 'candid and informal exchange regarding events in the past .... This
frank exchange is achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the
mediation will not be used to their detriment in later civil court proceedings and
other adjudicatory processes."' 36 Because of the importance of mediation confi-
dentiality, only express legislative exceptions are permitted.37 Waiver of media-
tion confidentiality cannot be implied. 38 These principles are consistent with the
maxim of statutory construction, expression unius est exclusion alterius, which
means that a court cannot expand legislative exemptions unless there is a clear
legislative intent to the contrary.39
Thus, in Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc., the
California Supreme Court held that it had no authority to create judicial excep-
34. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West 2005). That statutes provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter:
(a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of,
or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery,
and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adju-
dication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony
can be compelled to be given.
(b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course of,
or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery,
and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudi-
cation, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can
be compelled to be given.
(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants
in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall remain confidential.
35. CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1119(a) & (b) (West 2005).
36. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001)
(quoting Nat. Conf. of Comrs. On U. State Laws, U. Mediation Act (May 2001) § 2, Reports Work-
ing Notes, 1 1).
37. Foxgate Homeowners'Ass'n, 25 P.3d at 1126 (holding that the court of appeal improperly
considered a mediator's report regarding one party's attempts to thwart the mediation process and in
doing so, had created a judicial exception to confidentiality outside of the provisions of Evidence
Code sections 1119 and 1121).
38. See Eisendrath v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 724-26 (Ct. App. 2003) (refusing
to allow introduction of mediation communications despite petitioner's declaration regarding con-
versations between the parties, especially in light of the express waiver provision of Evidence Code
section 1122).
39. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270 (Cal. 2004).
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tions to Evidence Code section 1119 because the statutory language was "clear
and unambiguous."4 ° A court or other adjudicatory proceeding may not admit or
consider evidence of communications made during a mediation.4' As a result, a
mediator violated the confidentiality provisions of section 1119 by filing a re-
port with the court regarding one party's bad faith tactics during the mediation
process. That action violated the plain meaning of the Evidence Code.42
Three years later, the California Supreme Court addressed mediation confi-
dentiality again. This time the court faced the difficult question of whether or
not to admit photographs in a lawsuit when the photographs had been prepared
for a previous mediation and no other evidence existed to show the damaged
property. Again, the Supreme Court took a hard line in favor of mediation con-
fidentiality, noting that it was "essential to effective mediation."43  The court
also held that the attorney work product privilege, even when considered as a
qualified privilege, did not apply to section 1119.' The court was not willing to
extend the legislative purpose of the mediation confidentiality statutes, implying
that if the legislature wanted the work product doctrine to apply to a mediation,
it would have incorporated such exception into section 1119.4
The California Supreme Court asserts a very strict interpretation of the me-
diation confidentiality statutes, refusing to expand beyond the legislature's find-
ings. The court's practice is particularly apparent as it strictly construes the
legislative exceptions to mediation confidentiality. For example, parties may
expressly agree, whether orally or in writing, to disclose a "communication,
document or writing" that relates to a mediation.46 Legislation also permits
discovery of protected communications and writings if they are prepared by less
40. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, 1117 P.3d at 1126-29.
41. Id. at 1129.
42. Id. at 1128.
43. Rojas, 93 P.3d at 269. The Rojas court specifically held that "the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that photographs, videotapes, witness statements, and 'raw test data' from physical sam-
ples collected at the complex-such as reports describing the existence or amount of mold spores in
a sample-that were 'prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, [the] mediation' in
the underlying action are not protected under section 1119."
44. Id. at 270.
45. Id.
46. CAL. EVID. CODE § 122(a)(1) (West 2005) ("A communication or a writing, as defined in
Section 250, that is made or prepared for the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a media-
tion or a mediation consultation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provi-
sions of this chapter if either of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) All persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the mediation expressly agree in writing, or
orally in accordance with Section 1118, to disclosure of the communication, document, or writing.").
9
Exon: California's Opportunity to Create Historical Precedent Regarding
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2005
than all of the mediation participants, the parties expressly agree to the disclo-
sure, and the disclosure would not reveal admissions or communications said or
done during the mediation.47
The California Legislature has specifically addressed settlement agreements
and created limited exceptions to the confidentiality provisions of section
1119.48 If any of the following four provisions is met, a signed settlement
agreement entered into pursuant to, or during the course of, a mediation may be
discoverable:
(a) The agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure,
or words to that effect.
(b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words
to that effect.
(c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing, or orally in
accordance with Section 1118, to its disclosure.
(d)The agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is
relevant to an issue in dispute.
49
Even if a mediated settlement agreement fits into one of the four categories
of section 1123, it may be deemed inadmissible based on some other authority. °
As a result, section 1123 should not be read to the exclusion of other evidentiary
principles.
C. What Constitutes an Agreement to Arbitrate
The principal case involves a mediated settlement agreement and an arbitra-
tion clause within that agreement. It is necessary, therefore, to address general
contract law principles that govern both types of agreements. As noted in Part
II.A. of this article, California law interprets settlement agreements based on
contract law principles.5
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122(a)(2) (2005) ("A communication or a writing, as defined in
Section 250, that is made or prepared for the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a media-
tion or a mediation consultation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provi-
sions of this chapter if either of the following conditions is satisfied:
(2) The communication, document, or writing was prepared by or on behalf of fewer than all
the mediation participants, those participants expressly agree in writing, or orally in accor-
dance with Section 1118, to its disclosure, and the communication, document, or writing does
not disclose anything said or done or any admission made in the course of the mediation.").
48. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123 (West 2005).
49. Id.
50. See Law Review Commission Comments to CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1123 (West 2005).
51. See supra notes 6 - 16 and accompanying text.
10
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California's Arbitration Act treats arbitration agreements similarly.52  For
example, a written agreement to submit a specified controversy to arbitration "is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revo-
cation of any contract., 53 In other words, general contract law provisions con-
trol determinations regarding the validity of arbitration agreements,54 including
party intent.
55
The petitioner has the burden to prove the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement; the party opposing the petition must show by a preponderance of
evidence facts necessary for a defense to enforcement. 6 California's legislation
satisfies federal law, and in particular the Federal Arbitration Act.57
California courts analyze the enforceability of arbitration agreements by fo-
cusing on whether they implicate public or private rights.58 For example, public
rights include statutory rights and allegations of wrongful employment termina-
tion in violation of public policy (otherwise known as Tameny claims).59 Five
requirements must be satisfied, although a detailed explanation is beyond the
scope of this article since public rights are not implicated in Fair v. Bakhtiari.
60
With respect to private rights, courts analyze arbitration agreements based on
conscionability standards.6 1
52. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280 et seq. (West 2005).
53. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 2005).
54. Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, 862 P.2d 158, 161 (Cal. 1993) (involving agreement to
engage in private arbitration); Blake v. Ecker, 113 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[U]nder
California law, as under federal law, an arbitration agreement may only be invalidated for the same
reasons as other contracts.") (quoting Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6
P.3d 669, 679 (Cal. 2000)).
55. Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 813 (Ct.
App. 2002) (noting that contract law provisions are used to give effect to the parties' intentions
regarding arbitration agreements).
56. Banner Entm't, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 602 (Ct. App. 1998).
57. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (2000).
58. Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422,432 (Ct. App. 2004).
59. Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 433 (referring to Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.
3d 167 (1980)).
60. Agreements to arbitrate public policy rights must satisfy five requirements: 1) provide for
discovery; 2) require a written decision allowing limited judicial review; 3) permit types of relief
available in court; 4) limit the employees' forum costs; and 5) provide for a neutral arbitrator. Ar-
mendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000); Abramson, 9
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 433-44.
61. Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 435.
225
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Thus, courts may refuse to enforce arbitration provisions that are "'uncon-
scionable or contrary to public policy."' 62 The notion of unconscionability is
both procedural and substantive,63 and California courts must make a finding of
both before they will refuse to compel arbitration.' One need not prove proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability to the same degree. If evidence is
greater to support one type of unconscionability, less may be needed to establish
the other.65
Procedural unconscionability focuses on "'oppression or surprise due to un-
equal bargaining power.' 66 In this context, oppression occurs when there is no
"meaningful choice" for, or opportunity to negotiate by, one party.67 The sur-
prise element occurs when the arbitration provision is hidden in the agreement
by the one who prepared it.68 The issue of procedural unconscionability is not
dispositive simply because a form contract is used. 69 An example of a proce-
durally unconscionable clause is a contract of adhesion whereby a party of supe-
rior bargaining power presents the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 7° Cali-
fornia courts have held as procedurally unconscionable, certain mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in employment contracts because the clause may stand in the way
of necessary employment.7'
Courts are less willing to find the same type of pressure for a contract in
which economic necessity is not at issue. Hence, in Crippen v. Central Valley
RV Outlet, Inc., the court held that an arbitration clause in a contract to purchase
a used motor home was not procedurally unconscionable, even when presented
on a preprinted form.72 Moreover, that arbitration clause was included on a
62. Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 432).
63. Nyulassy, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305.
64. Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 190 (Ct. App. 2004) ("It
is now blackletter law that a motion to compel arbitration must be denied if the arbitration agreement
is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.") (emphasis in original).
65. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690; Crippen, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 192.
66. Nyulassy, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) and Abramson v.
Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 435-36 (Ct. App. 2004)). In Abramson, the court held
that an arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable due to the high degree of oppressiveness
because an arbitration agreement was presented on a take it or leave it basis. Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 441-42.
67. Crippen, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 193.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 983-84 (Cal. 2003) (involving an employ-
ment contract prepared by the employer that necessarily creates economic pressure for a prospective
employee who is seeking necessary employment); Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet, Inc., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 189, at 194 (Ct. App. 2004); Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 441-44.
71. Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 307-12 (Ct. App. 2004); Little,
63 P.3d at 983-84.
72. Crippen, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194.
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separate page that made it easily identifiable and the plaintiff failed to show any
extrinsic evidence to establish the unconscionability.73
Substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the agreement74 and
whether they have an "'overly harsh or one sided"' result.7 5 The paramount
considerations are mutuality and whether the terms of a contract are one-sided.76
An arbitration provision, therefore, will be deemed unconscionable where only
the weaker party's issues are subject to arbitration with no reasonable basis for
the lack of mutuality.77 For example, in Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., the
court held that a provision was substantively unconscionable where it required
both parties to arbitrate any dispute or controversy arising out of an agreement,
subject to the company's unilateral right to seek injunctive relief regarding
specified issues.78
One must keep in mind that public policy favors arbitration. 79 "[D]oubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues are to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion."
80
Relying on the foregoing authorities, several cases illustrate the tension be-
tween the public policy in favor of arbitration and strict adherence to basic con-
tract law. In Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court, the issue was
whether a proposed written agreement was binding on a party who had not yet
signed it; the agreement included an arbitration clause. 8' The parties exchanged
drafts of a written agreement although they made no comments regarding the
arbitration clause. In the meantime, the parties operated pursuant to an oral
73. Id. at 193.
74. Nyulassy, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
75. Id. at 305 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) and Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 435-36 (Ct. App. 2004)). In Abramson, the court held that an arbitration provi-
sion was substantively unconscionable because it lacked mutuality. Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
443-44.
76. Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 436.
77. Id. at 436-37; compare with Oakland-Alamedia County Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners,
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 369 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement was not uncon-
scionable because it was mutual in all respects, was made by parties of apparently equal bargaining
power, and did not appear to be a contract of adhesion).
78. Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 443-44 n3.
79. Reigelsperger v. Siller, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 253 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 678 (Cal. 2000)); Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
432; Nyulassy, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
80. Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oaks Street, 673 P.2d 251, 257 (Cal.
1983)).
81. Banner Entm't, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 603-04 (Ct. App. 1998).
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agreement for limited services. The oral agreement did not address the issue of
arbitration. Despite the oral agreement, the court held that the written agreement
was never finalized because the parties never had a meeting of the minds regard-
ing the written agreement.82 Without mutual consent, an enforceable written
contract did not exist. As a result, no evidence existed, oral or written, that the
parties agreed to arbitrate any future dispute."
Similarly, an agreement to agree does not constitute a binding contract.' 4 In
Beck v. American Health Group International, Inc.,85 a hospital sent a letter to
plaintiff psychiatrist outlining a proposed business arrangement. The letter spe-
cifically stated that it was an "outline of our future agreement" and concluded
with a statement that once the psychiatrist signed the letter, the hospital would
forward it on to corporate counsel to prepare a draft contract for discussion.8 6
The court relied on general contract principles. Preliminary negotiations do not
constitute a binding contract. 87 "A manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason
to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he
has made a further manifestation of assent. '88 The court also noted that it must
look at the written document to ascertain the ordinary meaning - an objective
test - to interpret the parties' intent. The court held that the letter evidenced an
intent that a binding contract would not be created until corporate counsel
drafted a formal contract.89
None of the foregoing opinions relates to mediated settlement agreements.
One must, therefore, analyze the principal case to ascertain how the California
judiciary applies the preceding legal principles within the context of a media-
tion.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF FAIR V. BAKHTIARI
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff R. Thomas Fair filed a complaint against several defendants alleg-
ing causes of action for breach of contract, various torts, and wrongful and re-
taliatory termination in violation of public policy.9" The parties stipulated to a
82. Id.
83. Id. at 606.
84. Beck v. Am. Health Group Int'l, Inc., 260 Cal. Rptr. 237, 242 (Ct. App. 1989).
85. 260 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1989).
86. Id. at 240.
87. Id. at 241.
88. Id. (quoting Duran v. Duran, 197 Cal. Rptr. 497, 150 Cal. App. 3d 176, 180 (1983)).
89. Id. at 241-42.
90. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 592 (Ct. App. 2004).
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private mediation, which was held on March 20 and 21, 2002.9' The parties
concluded the mediation by signing, along with the mediator, the Settlement
Terms Document. It included nine numbered paragraphs.92 The final paragraph
and the one about which the present dispute arose stated, "9. Any and all dis-
putes subject to JAMS arbitration rules."93
Based on the Settlement Terms Document, the parties attempted to memori-
alize their agreement in a formal Settlement Agreement and General Release.
Some complicated tax issues ensued, and then there was some dispute about the
inclusion of additional terms in the final settlement agreement. In the meantime,
counsel for both parties filed Case Management/ADR Conference Question-
naires, indicating that the case had settled after two days of mediation and noti-
fying the trial judge that a formal settlement agreement and general release was
being circulated for approval. 4
Counsel for defendants prepared the draft Settlement Agreement and Gen-
eral Release ("Settlement Agreement"), indicating that it should take effect as of
March 21, 2002, the final day of the mediation.95 The Settlement Agreement
also confirmed the parties' agreement to arbitrate as follows: "'[any dispute
regarding any aspect' of the settlement agreement, including 'its interpretation,
91. Id.
92. The nine numbered paragraphs are:
"1. Cash payment of $5.4 mm to T. Fair w/in 60 days.
"2. Payment treated as purchase of all T. Fair's stock & interests (as capital gain to Fair)[.]
"3. [Defendants] will not look to Fair for reimbursement or indemnification of any phantom income
paid by them to date.
"4. This provision relates solely to Fair's right to indemnity and does not preclude other rights of the
parties. Fair will be indemnified as a former officer, director & employee by SFC/SMC/SC, accord-
ing to applicable law, against all 3 d party claims, including LPs [limited partners] or IRS, arising
from the operation of SFC/SMC. Fair will not make any adverse contacts with IRS [or] LPs re:
SFC/SMC, at risk of loss of indemnity and will not suggest, foment or encourage litigation by LPs or
any individual against defendants, at risk of loss of indemnity.
"5. Maryann Fair disclaims any community prop[erty] interest in settlement proceeds.
"6. Parties will sign mutual releases and dismiss with prejudice all claims. An't of settlement will
be confidential with appropriate exceptions.
"7. All sides bear their own attorneys fees and costs, including experts.
"8. If Fair needs to restructure cash payments for tax purposes, defendants will cooperate (at no
additional cost to defendants).
"9. Any and all disputes subject to JAMS arbitration rules."
Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 591.
93. Id. at 592-93.
94. Id. at 593.
95. Id.
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or any act that allegedly has or would violate any provision' of the settlement."96
Due to differing opinions, the parties could not finalize the Settlement Agree-
ment.
On June 6, 2002 defendants obtained new counsel. The new counsel filed a
Case Management/ADR Conference Questionnaire indicating that the parties
were not able to settle the case through mediation.97
Unable to come to a consensus regarding the final Settlement Agreement,
plaintiff invoked paragraph nine of the Settlement Terms Document and at-
tempted to arbitrate the unresolved issues. Defendants, however, refused.
Thereafter, on June 20, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion to compel arbitration and
stay proceedings. The trial court denied the motion and the plaintiff appealed.9"
The plaintiff argued that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, the
trial court erred in denying his motion.99
The case involved two issues:
1. Do the terms of a mediated settlement agreement satisfy California Evidence Code section
S1123's exceptions to the confidentiality rule of Evidence Code section 1119?
2. If yes to the first issue, does an arbitration provision of a hand-written mediated settlement
agreement constitute a valid agreement to arbitrate future disputes?l
°°
The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District engaged in a
de novo review and answered both issues in the affirmative. As a result, it re-
versed the trial court.10'
B. Appellate Court's Analysis of Confidentiality Exceptions
As noted above, mediations are deemed confidential," 2 subject to express
legislative exceptions.'0 3 The trial court refused to admit the Settlement Terms
Document because it relied on the confidentiality of mediations and held that no
exceptions applied and no waiver existed."°
The Fair appellate court quoted the provisions of both Evidence Code sec-
tions 1119'05 and 1123" and relied extensively on the California Supreme
Court's analysis of those statutes in Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea
96. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Ct. App. 2004).
97. Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593-94 (Ct. App. 2004).
98. Id. at 593.
99. Id. at 594.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 594-95.
102. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2005).
103. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1122, 1123 (West 2005).
104. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 594 (Ct. App. 2004).
105. See supra notes 34 - 35 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 48 - 50 and accompanying text.
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CalifoMia, Inc. 107 Like Foxgate, the Fair court relied on the maxims of statutory
interpretation, holding that since both sections 1119 and 1123 were clear and
unambiguous, the judiciary was precluded from construing them. The court
acknowledged that the legislature carefully had carved out explicit exceptions to
the mediation confidentiality requirements, and therefore, courts were not at
liberty to create additional exceptions.'0 8
The court of appeal also examined the legislative purpose of Evidence Code
section 1123(b). Specifically, the Law Revision Commission Comments to
section 1123 indicate that subdivision (b) was added in 1997 so that parties who
intended to be bound by a mediated settlement agreement were likely to use
words such as "enforceable" or "binding" rather than the language of subdivi-
sion (a) - "admissible" or "subject to disclosure."'0 9 The court explained that
this comment and the language of section 1123 established that the legislature
was concerned with the parties' intent to be bound by an agreement rather than
focus on precise words of a settlement agreement."10
The Fair appellate court then applied the exception of section 1123(b) to its
facts. As noted above, subdivision (b) refers to a signed, "written settlement
agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation" as long as the
agreement specifies it is "enforceable or binding or words to that effect."'" The
court acknowledged that the Settlement Terms Document did not include the
words, "enforceable" or "binding." ' 2
But the court held that paragraph nine satisfied the requirement of "words to
that effect."'"13 The court rationalized that paragraph nine - "any and all disputes
subject to JAMS arbitration rules" - meant that the parties intended for JAMS to
arbitrate any dispute related to the Settlement Terms Document. The parties'
intent, according to the court, was to create a binding and enforceable settlement
agreement."' Since a clear legislative intent existed to make such a settlement
agreement admissible, the court held that the Settlement Terms Document fell
within the statutory exception of Evidence Code section 1123(b)." 5 As a result,
107. 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
108. Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595.
109. Id. at 596.
110. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 596 (Ct. App. 2004).
111. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
112. Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
113. Id. (referring to the language of paragraph 9 that said "[alny and all disputes subject to
JAMS arbitration rules").
114. Id.
115. Id.
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the appellate court held that the trial court erred because the Settlement Terms
Document should not be deemed confidential. " 6
C. Appellate Court's Analysis of a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate
Notwithstanding the court's holding on the first issue, the defendants argued
that the Settlement Terms Document did not constitute an agreement between
the parties for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. Therefore,
the petition must be denied." 7 The trial court never addressed this issue because
it held that the Settlement Terms Document was confidential."18
The Fair appellate court relied on the general contract principles cited in
Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick" 9 and Meyer v. Benko, 120 to the effect that
a settlement agreement is a contract that requires mutuality.12 ' Mutuality is de-
termined objectively by examining the parties' conduct. The Fair appellate
court engaged in this same type of objective analysis.
First, the court held that the Settlement Terms Document set forth "all of
the material terms of the settlement."'' 2 2 It included provisions regarding pay-
ment, indemnification, waiver of community property interest, mutual releases,
confidentiality, dismissal of suit, and attorneys' fees and costs.'23
Second, all parties signed the Settlement Terms Document. In the absence
of fraud and imposition, a party who signs an agreement is deemed to have read
and understood its terms. 124
Third, upon signing the Settlement Terms Document the parties acted con-
sistently with the fact that they understood its terms. 25 The court cited examples
such as the filing of Case Management/ADR Conference Questionnaires that
indicated that the case had settled at mediation and that a settlement agreement
was being circulated for approval and signatures. They also specified that the
case would be dismissed with prejudice. 26 Counsel reiterated the same basic
information at an April 17, 2002 hearing. As a result, the trial court granted a
sixty-day continuance to allow the parties to finalize the settlement. The court
116. Id. at 597.
117. Fair v. Bakhtiari, No. A100240, slip op. at 11 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004).
118. Id. at 12.
119. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Ct. App. 1998).
120. 127 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1976).
121. Fair v. Bakhtiari, No. A100240, slip op. at 12 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004).
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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noted that defendants' subsequent denials of a settlement contradict the other
behavior.
27
Fourth, the court examined the content of the proposed Settlement Agree-
ment, which included "virtually all of the terms of the settlement terms docu-
ment nearly verbatim."'' 28 In particular, the court noted the following provision:
"It is now the desire and intention of the Parties to settle and resolve, as of and
effective March 21, 2002, all disputes, differences and claims which Fair may
have against Defendants and Defendants may have against Fair."'
129 The court
emphasized that this provision illustrated the parties' understanding that the
settlement would take effect as of the date of the signed Settlement Terms
Document. 3 ° The court rejected defendants' contention that the Settlement
Terms Document was only an agreement to agree.' 3'
Instead, the court relied on Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp.'
3 2 for the propo-
sition that as long as parties have agreed to existing terms, their agreement is not
made invalid simply because it contemplates subsequent documentation.' The
court specifically stated:
The circulation of the draft agreement merely reflects the parties' desire, ascertainable from
the settlement terms document, to flesh out some of the details, including, for example, more
specific provisions regarding mutual release and confidentiality. While it is true that the draft
agreement is considerably longer than the settlement terms document, the settlement terms
document contained, albeit in a minimalist way, all of the crucial elements of the agreement,
every one of which was incorporated into the draft agreement. Contemplation of a formal
signed agreement thus is entirely consistent with mutual assent to and intent to be bound by
the material terms of the settlement terms document.134
Fifth, the court recognized the importance of paragraph nine as an enforce-
ment mechanism. A binding agreement was created because the parties agreed
that JAMS arbitration rules would be used to resolve any dispute.'
35
Finally, the court addressed defendants' contention that the Settlement
Terms Document did not constitute a final agreement since the parties could not
127. Fair v. Bakhtiari, No. A100240, slip op. at 13-14 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004).
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Ct. App. 1991).
133. Fair v. Bakhtiari, No. A100240, slip op. at 14 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004).
134. Id. at 14-15.
135. Id. at 15.
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agree on several remaining terms - the very reasons for which plaintiff sought
arbitration. The court held that the purpose of paragraph nine was to help re-
solve ambiguity when finalizing the formal Settlement Agreement. 136
As a result of the foregoing findings and analysis, the Fair appellate court
held that a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes under the Settlement Terms
Document did exist between the parties. Based on the court's analysis of both
issues, it reversed and remanded the trial court's order denying plaintiff's mo-
tion to compel arbitration.' 37
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF FAIR V. BAKHTIARI
Both the Fair trial court and the court of appeal divided the opinion into
two basic issues: 1) whether the confidentiality exception of California Evidence
Code section 1123(b) applied to the Settlement Terms Document; and 2)
whether a provision within the Settlement Terms Document constituted a valid
agreement to arbitrate. Each of the issues will be discussed separately.
A. Mediation Confidentiality
The Fair court of appeal concluded correctly that the Settlement Terms
Document was not confidential pursuant to Evidence Code section 1123(b), and
therefore, was subject to disclosure. Unfortunately, the court of appeal short-
circuited its analysis regarding mediation confidentiality.
To decide whether the confidentiality exceptions of Evidence Code section
1123 apply, one must first analyze whether a mediated settlement agreement
exists. Respondents attempted to focus the court in this direction by arguing that
no settlement agreement was actually approved as a result of the mediation.' 3 1
The court of appeal, however, glossed over that fundamental analysis and in-
stead focused on the confidentiality exceptions of section 1123; it simply stated
that it would engage in the confidentiality exception analysis "assuming [the
Settlement Terms Document] did in fact constitute an agreement between the
parties."'
39
The first issue should have been broken down into two sub-issues. The
court of appeal should have first determined whether the Settlement Terms
Document constituted a settlement agreement made pursuant to, or during the
course of, a mediation. If yes, then the court could engage in an analysis of
136. Id. at 15-16.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Ct. App. 2004) (arguing
that no binding settlement agreement or agreement to arbitrate was entered into since the parties had
failed to agree to complete terms).
139. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591,594 (Ct. App. 2004).
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section 1123 to determine whether any of the confidentiality exceptions applied.
This two-step analysis of the first issue is necessary since section 1123's confi-
dentiality exceptions are limited to settlement agreements.
1. Existence of a Mediated Settlement Agreement
As noted previously, settlement agreements are governed by general con-
tract law provisions." Mutuality of consent, a requirement of all contracts, is
determined based on objective criteria. To determine such mutuality, courts
focus primarily on the acts of the parties.'41
In Fair, the parties' actions illustrated that they entered into a settlement
agreement as part of their mediation. The court of appeal appropriately ana-
lyzed their actions, albeit regarding the second issue - the validity of an arbitra-
tion clause. In doing so, the court of appeal examined the material terms of the
Settlement Terms Document. It noted the offer and acceptance in terms of giv-
ing up of stock in return for $5.4 million, the payment provisions, indemnifica-
tion, Maryann Fair's waiver of community property interest in the settlement
proceeds, the confidential nature of the amount of the settlement, defendants'
agreement to cooperate if the payment schedule had to be restructured for tax
purposes, and the agreement to sign mutual releases and dismiss all claims with
prejudice. 42 The court acknowledged the parties' signatures as evidence that
they read and understood the terms of the Settlement Terms Document.
43
The court of appeal discussed at length activities of the parties taken subse-
quent to the two-day mediation. For example, the provisions of the Settlement
Terms Document were reiterated almost verbatim in the draft Settlement
Agreement; the Settlement Agreement specified that it would be effective as of
March 21, 2001, the date of the Settlement Terms Document; and, the parties
made representations on Case Management/ADR Conference Questionnaires
and in open court that the case had settled and final documents were being pre-
pared.'" These subsequent actions demonstrated the parties' understanding that
a settlement had been reached pursuant to the mediation.'
45
140. Weddington Prods. Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 276-77 (Ct. App. 1998).
141. See supra notes 9 - 11 and accompanying text.
142. Fair v. Bakhtiari, No. A100240, slip op. at 13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004).
143. Id.
144. Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 592-93 (Ct. App. 2004); Fair, No. A100240, slip op. at 13-14.
145. Although not mentioned by the court of appeal, Fair, in his Appellant's Opening Brief,
stated that on April 23, 2002, counsel for defendant Stonesfair Entities sent a letter to plaintiff's
21
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The court of appeal's analysis, however, could have been more thorough.
The court should have acknowledged the parameters of the mediation forum -
the very forum in which the parties agreed to settle their dispute.
A mediation forum is important to help establish that parties knowingly and
willingly entered into a settlement agreement. For example, a mediation in-
volves more than counsel of record. The parties also participate. The mediation
forum serves as an intimate setting in which the parties, counsel, and a neutral
third party mediator may communicate fully and confidentially with one an-
other. At the conclusion of a mediation in which settlement is reached, the par-
ties typically work together with their respective counsel to negotiate the finite
details of a settlement agreement.
A different dynamic occurs during settlement negotiations in a litigated
case. Typically an attorney and client discuss a proposal, and then the attorney
reduces the proposal to a writing to forward on to opposing counsel. Once op-
posing counsel receives the proposal, he or she takes the necessary time to dis-
cuss it with his or her client. Then the proposal is either accepted or a counter-
proposal is made. The proposals may go back and forth between counsel for
weeks or even months. By the time a settlement agreement is finalized, the
parties may sign it, forgetting the rationales for some of the important provisions
that were negotiated early in the process.
In Fair, the mediation lasted two days. The parties and attorneys could de-
vote their undivided attention to the specific dispute and work tenaciously to-
ward a final resolution.
Furthermore, the substance of their negotiations resulted in nine short para-
graphs in the Settlement Terms Document. The brevity of the document lends
itself to the conclusion that the parties knew the meaning and intent of each of
the nine paragraphs, including the arbitration provision.
Before a court can decide whether a mediated settlement agreement fits into
one of the confidentiality exceptions of Evidence Code section 1123, it must
first determine whether a settlement agreement actually exists. When the Fair
court of appeal analyzed the mediation confidentiality exceptions, it failed to
first analyze whether the Settlement Terms Document constituted a settlement
agreement. Instead, the court of appeal waited to discuss the existence of a me-
diated settlement agreement with respect to the second issue regarding arbitra-
tion. If the court had engaged in the analysis of this first sub-issue and deter-
mined that the Settlement Terms Document in fact constituted a settlement
agreement, then, and only then, should it have engaged in its analysis regarding
exceptions to confidentiality, the second sub-issue of the mediation confidential-
counsel, confirming that the parties had an "'agreed settlement of 5.4 million dollars."' Appellant's
Opening Brief at 7, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (2004).
236
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ity issue. 46 The sequence of the court's analysis, however, does not diminish
the correctness of the final result.
2. Analysis of Mediation Confidentiality Exceptions
Even though the Fair court of appeal failed to address whether a mediated
settlement agreement actually existed with respect to the first issue, it did ana-
lyze the confidentiality exceptions regarding a mediated settlement agreement.
The court's holding was correct and should be adopted by the California Su-
preme Court.
California's mediation confidentiality statutes encourage disputants to par-
ticipate in mediations based on predictability. The California Supreme Court
consistently has applied a strict interpretation of these statutes by refusing to
carve out judicial exceptions.'47
The California Supreme Court's practice is consistent with some jurisdic-
tions that have mediation confidentiality statutes. For example, several courts
have upheld mediation confidentiality in the absence of some writing to substan-
tiate a mediated settlement.'48 The rationale was that without some writing,
courts would have to breach the confidentiality of the mediation to determine
whether a settlement had been reached'49 and this procedure could have a chill-
ing effect on the settlement process. 5° Nevertheless, some complex matters
cannot be mediated to a final conclusion; parties may be able to agree to specific
terms or to an outline of the settlement terms but contemplate the preparation of
a detailed settlement agreement or some type of stipulated judgment and release.
In these latter situations, as long as the writing reflects the material terms of a
final settlement agreement and is signed by the parties and the mediator, such
146. Interestingly, the Fair court of appeal discussed the creation of a valid settlement agree-
ment when it analyzed the second issue. In doing so, it noted that "[c]ontemplation of a formal
signed agreement thus is entirely consistent with mutual assent to and intent to be bound by the
material terms of the settlement terms document." Fair, No. A100240, slip op. at 14-15.
147. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 269-70 (Cal. 2004); Foxgate Homeowners'
Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001).
148. Capano v. State, 832 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2003) ("Courts should not enforce a mediation
agreement absent a written document signed by the parties and the mediator."); Wilmington Hospi-
tality, L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536, 542 (Del. Ch. 2001) ("Where, as here, there is no
written agreement signed by anyone, it is impossible for the parties to litigate over the terms of the
putative agreement without breaching the confidentiality of the mediation process in a substantial
way.") (emphasis in original).
149. Wilmington Hospitality, LLC., 788 A.2d at 542.
150. Capano, 832 A.2d at 1250.
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writing should be enforceable without violating mediation confidentiality provi-
sions. "'
The Fair court of appeal adhered to well-founded rules regarding mediation
confidentiality. It acknowledged the public policy implications that are so
strong in California - to preserve confidentiality as a means to encourage par-
ticipants to enter into candid mediation discussions.'52 Section 1123(b), which
the Fair court examined, allows disclosure of a signed mediated settlement
agreement if it specifies it "is enforceable or binding or words to that effect."'' 53
All parties and the court of appeal acknowledged that the Settlement Terms
Document did not include words that it was enforceable or binding. 54 More-
over, party signatures alone do not meet the legislative definition of "enforce-
able or binding."'15
The Fair court of appeal focused on paragraph nine to hold that it complied
with a portion of the phrase, "words to that effect." In doing so, the court of
appeal analyzed the parties' intent and correctly held that the "inclusion of the
arbitration term demonstrates that the parties necessarily intended the settlement
terms document to be 'enforceable or binding."" 56 The court of appeal followed
the California Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the mediation confidenti-
ality statutes by limiting itself to the specific statutory exceptions of Evidence
Code section 1123.57
The holding makes sense because parties have the right to agree to private
contractual arbitration. Such contractual provisions contemplate that the parties
do not need nor want court involvement to resolve a dispute.'58 Rather, their
intent is to use an arbitrator to enforce the Settlement Terms Document. Any
151. See Wilmington Hospitality, LL.C., 788 A.2d at 542 n.8; Few v. Hammack Enters., Inc.
511 S.E.2d 665, 669-70 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that mediation confidentiality was not
breached by allowing the admission of evidence before a judge to determine the outcome of a media-
tion settlement conference based on a draft mediated settlement agreement proposed by the mediator
and signed only by the plaintiff); see also Peter Robinson, Symposium: Centuries of Contract Com-
mon Law Can't Be All Wrong: Why the UMA 's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforce-
ment Proceedings Should be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 135, 143 - 48 & n.48-
93 (2003) (discussing numerous cases that interpreted issues in proceedings to enforce mediated
agreements).
152. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (Ct. App. 2004).
153. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123(b) (West 2005).
154. Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
155. The main paragraph of Evidence Code section 1123 requires that parties sign the agree-
ment. Then the statute includes four specifically enumerated exceptions. See CAL. EvID. CODE §
1123(a) -(d) (West 2005).
156. Fair, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
157. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 269-70 (Cal. 2004); Foxgate Homeowners'
Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001).
158. Brennan v. Tremco Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 793 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a mali-
cious prosecution claim cannot be based on a previous matter resolved in a privately contracted
arbitration).
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expectation of finality is consistent with parties' choice of arbitration rather than
litigation.'59 "'The arbitrator's decision should be the end, not the beginning, of
the dispute."" 6  Hence, the parties' intent to add finality to the dispute should
be honored. That finality necessarily means that the arbitration provision of the
Settlement Terms Document creates a binding and enforceable settlement
agreement.
The court of appeal's holding also makes sense because when a document
refers to another document, it incorporates by reference the terms of the refer-
enced document.16' Since the Settlement Terms Document referred to the JAMS
Arbitration Rules, it incorporated the terms of the JAMS Arbitration Rules, in-
cluding their purpose - to "govern . . . 'binding Arbitrations of disputes or
claims that are administered by JAMS and in which the Parties agree to use
these Rules.""162 The purpose of the JAMS Arbitration Rules governs binding
arbitrations. If the arbitration is deemed binding, it should be equated to a final
and enforceable matter.
Fair's holding focused on the notion of confidentiality. Yet it had a far
greater impact because confidentiality affects other core values of mediation,
including party self-determination and facilitation by a third-party neutral. As
explained below, all of these values are so interrelated to one another that it is
difficult to affect one without affecting the others.
First, mediation, especially court-connected mediation, offers a unique fo-
rum in which disputants take charge of a litigated case. Scholars and legislators
alike have coined party self-determination as the "fundamental principle of me-
diation."' 163 Within the mediation forum, the parties must be confident of their
ability to control the process, and especially the final outcome. If, as in the pre-
sent situation, the parties have difficulty resolving the finite details of the overall
settlement, they should have the power to designate another dispute resolution
process such as arbitration and feel assured that their decision will be honored.
159. Id. ('"This expectation of finality strongly informs the parties' choice of an arbitral forum
over a judicial one."') (quoting Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasd, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, 187 (Ct. App.
1992)).
160. Brennan, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (quoting Moncharsh, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187).
161. See King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 226, 232 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
arbitration provisions of an Arbitration Manual were incorporated by reference into a contract as
long as all parties had ready access to the incorporated document); Applera Corp. v. Roche Molecu-
lar Systems, Inc., 2004 WL 2361794, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (noting that an agreement's
reference to the American Arbitration Association Rules incorporates all the powers specified in
those rules, including the scope of the agreement to arbitrate) (not certified for publication).
162. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 596 (Ct. App. 2004).(emphasis added).
163. BERNARD & GARTH, supra note 24, at 73.
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Their decision acknowledges the value of party-self determination because the
parties will be assured that they control the dispute resolution process by keep-
ing their dispute out of the court system. Furthermore, history has shown that
parties are satisfied more by a mediated settlement than one imposed by a judi-
cial officer."6
Second, mediation confidentiality is equally important and is not limitedjust to the parties; it applies to everyone involved in the mediation. If a mediator
is forced to testify about party behavior and statements communicated during a
mediation, her neutrality suffers. 65 California Evidence Code section 703.5
specifically precludes a mediator from testifying in subsequent civil proceedings
absent extraordinary circumstances, 166 emphasizing the importance of absolute
confidentiality by mediators.
A mediator's role in confidentiality plays into the third essential aspect of
mediation - a neutral facilitator. A mediator must be unbiased and evenhanded
in her approach; she must not take sides with any party. As a facilitator, a me-
diator can only be effective and earn the trust and loyalty of the parties if he or
she remains impartial. Mediator loyalty is at the center of California's legisla-
tive intent to preserve mediation confidentiality.'67
Confidentiality is a critical component of a mediation because it affects
other essential, interrelated mediation values such as party self-determination
and mediator impartiality. Confidentiality also affects the entire dispute resolu-
tion process because, as seen in Fair, mediations can tie directly to, and affect,
arbitrations. As a result, mediation professionals and participants must be as-
sured that mediation confidentiality, subject to specific exceptions, is predict-
able. The California Supreme Court has an opportunity to set the record straight
and confirm the value and predictability of confidentiality when it renders its
opinion in Fair.
164. See e.g., Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687,
1764 (1997) (noting that parties to community-enabling mediation "may be happier with an outcome
that they have not yet been able to contemplate."); see Izumi & La Rue, supra note 27, at 83-87)(acknowledging that party self-determination results in "parties [who] are happier with and more
likely to honor an agreement..."); Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to
Ensure Mediator Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 723, 730 (1996) (not-
ing that disputants are "happier and more compliant with an agreement they have forged them-
selves").
165. See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 27, at 84 ("The appearance of mediator neutrality is
dependent on the protection of confidentiality.").
166. CAL. EviD. CODE § 703.5 (allowing a mediator to testify in subsequent civil proceedings
only where the "(a) testimony relates to civil or criminal contempt, (b) constitutes a crime, (c) is
subject to investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial Performance, or (d) gives rise to
disqualification proceedings under Civil Procedure Code section 170.l(a)(l) or (a)(6).").
167. See supra note 166 and accompanying text for a discussion of California Evidence Code
section 703.5.
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B. Enforceability of Mediated Agreement to Arbitrate
Fair's second issue was whether paragraph nine of the Settlement Terms
Document constituted a valid agreement to arbitrate future disputes. This issue
created a tremendous breakthrough for California courts inasmuch as no Cali-
fornia opinion exists that addresses enforcement of an arbitration provision in a
mediated settlement agreement. 68 Unfortunately, that portion of the Fair court
of appeal opinion was not certified for publication.' 69
The lack of certification for publication was a poor decision for several rea-
sons. The issue is directly connected to the first issue dealing with the confiden-
tial nature of a settlement agreement entered into pursuant to, or in the course of,
a mediation. As previously discussed, parties to a mediation need predictability.
They need to know that, subject to legislative exceptions, what is said and com-
municated in a mediation will remain confidential, including mediated settle-
ment agreements.
Furthermore, parties to a mediation need guidance with respect to the sub-
stantive terms they may insert into their mediated settlement agreements. When
parties agree to certain terms and provisions, they need to know that the assent
to which they mutually intend will be given effect. Otherwise, mediated settle-
ment agreements will become a mockery of the entire mediation process.
For example, in Fair the parties included the arbitration provision in para-
graph nine of the Settlement Terms Document. Arbitration provisions are com-
mon clauses in settlement agreements. That fact should not change when ap-
plied to mediated settlement agreements. Yet, California courts have not yet
construed arbitration provisions within mediated settlement agreements, and
therefore, precedent is not available.
168. One California court of appeal was faced with issues surrounding a purported mediated
settlement agreement. See Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Ct. App. 1998).
In Flick, the court held that since the parties never had a meeting of the minds regarding essential
terms of the settlement agreement, a contract had not been formed. Id. at 280. Additionally, when
the ADR session changed from mediation to one in which a private judge determined the terms of
settlement and issued an order to that effect, such proceeding could not be treated as a mediation.
Hence, the mediation confidentiality provisions of California Evidence Code section 1152.5 (the
predecessor to section 1123) did not apply. Id. at 282 n.6.
169. The caption of the court of appeal opinion states that "(plursuant to California Rules of
Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of footnote
5, the second paragraph of part I and footnote 6, and part III."
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The Fair appellate court had an ideal opportunity to make an historical de-
cision to provide guidance to the developing field of dispute resolution. It fell
short of that precedential value.
Even though the court of appeal's depublication was ill advised, its substan-
tive analysis of issue two was correct. Fair correctly decided that the Settlement
Terms Document included a valid agreement to arbitrate. The phrase, "any and
all disputes subject to JAMS arbitration rules," is clear on its face. It is part of a
private contractual agreement to arbitrate. Any failure to recognize the agree-
ment to arbitrate infringes on parties' right to choose.
In Fair, there is no allegation of any contract defense, such as fraud, duress,
coercion, illegality or unconscionability in signing the Settlement Terms Docu-
ment. 70 No party alleged they misunderstood what was signed. The Settlement
Terms Document was a simple, handwritten settlement agreement consisting of
nine short paragraphs. The final paragraph constituted an enforcement mecha-
nism as the parties attempted to memorialize the agreement into a formal settle-
ment agreement and general release. As previously explained, the parties' intent
was clear and should be enforced based on general contract law provisions. 7'
Additionally, strong public policy exists that favors arbitration as an alterna-
tive to litigation. Private arbitration is speedier and more economical than litiga-
tion. "'72 It is a private process that parties can control. Contractual provisions to
arbitrate contemplate that the parties do not need nor want court involvement to
resolve a dispute.' In fact, paragraph nine as well as the Settlement Terms
Document as a whole, implicate the simple theory of a gentleman's handshake
based on terms that were negotiated and bargained for.' 4 Without any finding
of a contract defense, the agreement to arbitrate should be enforced. It repre-
sents a means to promote the very essence of a conciliatory proceeding. The
Fair court of appeal, therefore, correctly held that paragraph nine of the Settle-
ment Terms Document constituted a valid agreement to arbitrate. The analysis
should not end there, however.
If a court decides that the arbitration clause constitutes a valid arbitration
agreement, then what can an arbitrator do? What authority does an arbitrator
170. In their appellate brief, defendants contend that plaintiff's tax structuring was unlawful,
although defendants do not explain this contention and the court does not address it. Respondents'
Brief at 7, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Ct. App. 2004).
171. See supra notes 119 - 137 and accompanying text.
172. Brennan v. Tremco Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 793 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting that when
parties select arbitration, they "voluntarily trade [away] the safeguards and formalities of court
litigation .....
173. Id.
174. See Bd. of Educ. of the County of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439, 447
(W. Va. 1977) (noting that the issue of whether an arbitration provision is bargained for is a question
of law for the court to decide and that in most jurisdictions there is a strong presumption that an
arbitration provision is part of the bargain).
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possess? Irrespective of the admissibility of the Settlement Terms Document,
including the arbitration clause, mediation confidentiality extends to more than
just a written agreement. It applies to the entire mediation process, and in par-
ticular, all evidence, communications, and negotiations leading up to the settle-
ment agreement.' 75 Even if a court determines that an arbitration clause exists in
a mediated settlement agreement, how can an arbitrator decide whether or how
to resolve the dispute in light of mediation confidentiality? The confidential
nature of mediations precludes the arbitrator from delving into the minds and
thought processes of the participants, attempting to discern their intent to finally
resolve the mediated dispute.'76 This scenario creates a conflict between media-
tion confidentiality and the right to enforce settlement agreements. Fair, unfor-
tunately, never addressed the reality of this ultimate dilemma.' 77
Several alternatives exist to address the dilemma. The parties can agree to
waive confidentiality.'78 The express waiver allows the arbitrator to examine
and analyze facts inherent to a finding of party intent.
Or, the California Legislature can create a new confidentiality exception -
the arbitral or ADR exception of a mediated settlement agreement. The purpose
behind the arbitral/ADR exception is that if parties include an agreement to arbi-
trate or engage in some other dispute resolution process in their mediated set-
tlement agreement, certainly they intend to carry out the terms of the mediated
settlement agreement through some self-selected form of dispute resolution as
an alternative to litigation.
The purpose of the arbitral/ADR exception is easy to rationalize. The par-
ties need a neutral outsider to make a final decision since they may not be able
to do so during the mediation. The parties elect to stay out of the judicial sys-
tem. And, the arbitrator or other neutral facilitator needs authority to act in or-
der to carry out party intent.
A third alternative rests with the judiciary. The California Supreme Court
could rely on public policy to create the arbitral/ADR exception rather than wait
for legislative action. In light of the California Supreme Court's strict construc-
175. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West 2005).
176. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1119, 1122 (West 2005).
177. Fair is distinguishable from Regents of the Univ. of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr.
2d 200 (Ct. App. 1996), in which the Court of Appeal for the First District held that communications
surrounding a transcribed mediated settlement agreement were discoverable because the creation of
the transcript occurred after the parties had concluded their mediation. Id. at 202. It is also notewor-
thy that Sumner was decided under the previous Evidence Code section 1152.2 which barred evi-
dence of a settlement agreement reached during the mediation session. Id.
178. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1122(a), 1123(c) (West 2005).
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tion of the mediation confidentiality statutes, however, this alternative is
unlikely.
Finally, the California Legislature could revise section 1123 to simply per-
mit the discovery and admissibility of any agreement signed by all of the parties
to the mediation. This would preclude protracted litigation to determine the
meaning of "words to that effect." Through the Fair appeal, the California Su-
preme Court has an opportunity to make a strong suggestion that the legislature
should revise section 1123 accordingly.
In reality, California's law regarding mediation confidentiality is too rigid.
As illustrated in Fair, the rigid nature of the statutes actually has created more
problems than solutions. Confidentiality serves as the backbone of the media-
tion process, and the public policy reasons that promote candid and unfettered
communication is sound. Confidentiality of mediated settlement agreements,
however, poses different constraints.
When parties sign a settlement agreement at the end of a mediation, they are
knowingly entering into a contract. If one party seeks to repudiate the contract,
then the aggrieved party should have the right to enforce the agreement based on
general contract law principles. Likewise, if the terms of mediated settlement
agreements are deemed vague or ambiguous, the parties should be permitted to
prove their intent. Aggrieved parties should have the opportunity to prove the
intent of the settlement agreement even if that means delving into the confiden-
tial communications of the mediation.
The inclusion of an arbitration clause in a mediated settlement agreement
confirms that the parties select to keep the matter out of the public records of the
judiciary, within the confines of another private dispute resolution process.
Having control over a private contractual arbitration, the parties can stipulate
that the proceeding remain confidential, thus preserving the confidential nature
of the mediation yet permitting another informal process - arbitration - to create
and enforce finality.'79
One might argue that the confidential nature of mediations will be shattered
and the entire mediation process impacted adversely if parties are allowed to use
mediation communications to prove the terms of a mediated settlement agree-
ment. That argument lacks merit as long as the mediated settlement agreement
is treated independently from the communications leading up to the agreement.
The focus of concern, therefore, shifts from the rigid interpretation of mediation
confidentiality toward acknowledgement of a self-determined settlement. This
new policy should not affect the public policy aspects of mediations because
their confidential nature remains intact. Rather, the new policy should discour-
179. See, e.g., Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 123 N.W.2d 371,
375 (Minn. 1963) (acknowledging that parties may control a private contractual arbitration by the
language of their agreement to arbitrate).
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age parties from signing a settlement agreement at the conclusion of a mediation
unless they have an intent to finally and conclusively resolve the dispute; in such
a situation, then all matters communicated during or pursuant to a mediation
should be admissible to prove the intent of the mediated settlement agreement.
The suggestion posed in this article is not new. The Uniform Mediation Act
was carefully crafted to exempt from the confidentiality privilege all agreements
"signed by all parties to the agreement."' 80 Many states have adopted similar
provisions as well.' 8' The simple reference to "signed agreements" is easy to
understand and easy to construe. The simplicity of such a provision diminishes,
rather than increases, the potential for confusion that results in litigation, as evi-
denced by Fair.
Furthermore, if parties refer to another dispute resolution process in their
mediated settlement agreement, it is clear that the parties are searching for alter-
natives to litigation. To the extent that mediation and arbitration become inter-
related such as in the Fair scenario, we need to encourage, not discourage, the
use of alternatives to litigation. This rationale also is consistent with Califor-
nia's strong public policy favoring arbitration over litigation because arbitration
is speedy, cost effective for the parties, and eases court congestion.'82
Fair's significance goes deeper than the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement. The court must analyze the impact that such a finding has on the
arbitrator's authority to delve into the mediated information in order to give
effect to the parties' intent. Otherwise, any finding that an arbitration agreement
exists will have no meaning and effect on the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Fair v. Bakhtiari represents a case of first impression for the California
courts, and the novelty of the issues lends itself to creating precedent for future
decisions. Fair's issues are critical for the Fair participants as well as the de-
180. Uniform Mediation Act, § 6(a)(1) (2003), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/61 /ulc/mediat/2003final- draft.htm.
181. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2935(a)(1) (2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1(1) (2005)
(acknowledging that mediation confidentiality shall not apply "in proceedings ... to enforce a set-
tlement of the action" and that such settlement must have been reduced to a writing and signed by
the parties); see also Uniform Mediation Act Symposium: Uniform Mediation Act, 2003 J. Disp.
Resol. 1, 37 (2003) (citing to many state statutes to support the statement that "[w]ritten agreements
are commonly excepted from mediation confidentiality protections...").
182. Pietrelli v. Peacock, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 689 (Ct. App. 1993) (involving medical mal-
practice claims).
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veloping field of dispute resolution. It is hoped, therefore, that every portion of
the Supreme Court's decision is certified for publication.
The California Supreme Court's inaugural interpretation of Evidence Code
section 1123 serves as the backbone for the entire opinion. Any discussion of
section 1123 must be preceded by a finding that a settlement agreement was
actually entered into in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation. Only then will
the exceptions of section 1123 apply.
This author believes that the Supreme Court should affirm the First District
Court of Appeal and answer both issues in the affirmative. First, it should con-
firm that a signed document, entitled "Settlement Terms," constitutes a mediated
settlement agreement because it complies with general contract law principles.
It also comports with the mediation confidentiality exception of section 1123(b)
because the reference to JAMS arbitration illustrates the parties' intent to create
a binding or enforceable document. Second, the reference to JAMS arbitration
constitutes a valid agreement to arbitrate.
The Supreme Court's analysis needs to go further as it construes Evidence
Code section 1123 for the first time. Rather than blindly accept the legislation
as written, the Supreme Court needs to recognize the public policy implications
inherent in mediation confidentiality and party self-determination, as well as
general contract law principles. As explained in this article, the supreme court
should recognize and declare that Evidence Code section 1123 is too narrow.
As such, it should send a strong message to the California Legislature that sec-
tion 1123 needs to be revised so that any signed settlement agreement entered
into during, or pursuant to, a mediation is not subject to the general mediation
confidentiality rules. This analysis will foster the intent of the mediation par-
ticipants and provide confidence that their enforcement mechanism - a signed
mediated agreement - will have meaning, be recognized, and be upheld.
The California Supreme Court has never construed section 1123. It does
not have to agree with the legislature. It does, however, need to create a sense
of predictability and consistency regarding the significance of signed mediated
settlement agreements. The new analysis posed in this article will ensure that
parties sign a final agreement only when they have finally resolved their dispute;
it will prevent one party from hiding behind the rigid nature of mediation confi-
dentiality, attempting to avoid his obligations.
Moreover, it is imperative for courts to encourage parties' willingness to
engage in private dispute resolution processes, whether arbitration or otherwise.
Mediation confidentiality should not be used to thwart the positive aspects and
public policy reasons behind parties' right to contract for the dispute resolution
process of their choice. As a result, if a mediated agreement refers to another
dispute resolution process, such as arbitration, the ability to pierce mediation
confidentiality will provide authority for an arbitrator or other neutral facilitator
to act according to the parties' intent.
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The California Supreme Court has an opportunity to create historical precedence
when it renders its opinion in Fair. In doing so, it will affect two separate dis-
pute resolution processes and create predictability and consistency as the dispute
resolution processes become interconnected.
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